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According to the Philosophical Lexicon, to ‘planting’ is to ‘use twentieth-
century fertilizer to encourage new shoots from eleventh-century ideas which
everyone thought had gone to seed.’ Although the prominent US philosopher
Alvin Plantinga cannot be said to use medieval ideas in any historically informed
sense, he has certainly fertilized contemporary metaphysics, epistemology, and
philosophy of religion. His philosophy was given a comprehensive and systematic
analysis already in Alvin Plantinga, ed. Tomberlin (1985), and to this wide-ranging
Festschrift under review colleagues and former students contribute. For reasons
of space, this review focuses on themes and theses.
The book begins with a posthumous paper by James Tomberlin. ‘Actualism
and Presentism’ contains a twofold argument to the conclusion that there exist ob-
jects that are not actual nor present. First, deontic logic yields a reductio for the view
that only present and actual objects exist. Second, the logic of intentional verbs
challenges actualism and presentism. This previously published essay sharpens
Tomberlin’s earlier papers against actualism and presentism. They all rely on the
questionable assumption that modern predicate logic and semantics are reliable
guides to metaphysics.
‘Properties’ by Peter van Inwagen is also a previously published paper
(though shortened). He promotes a Quinean meta-ontology (that is, he endorses
Quine’s doctrine on quantification and ontological commitment for the meaning
of ‘being’), and argues for the existence of properties along the lines of the so-called
Quine-Putnam indispensibility argument for mathematical realism, namely that
we cannot dispense with quantification over properties. This results in a ’Very
nearly vacuous’ (26) theory of properties, according to which a property is what
must play the role in our discourse of ’thing that can be said of something.’ (27)
This account seems indeed rather vacuous in light of the history of philosophy.
In ‘So You Think You Exist?’ Jenann Ismael and John Pollock argue for
‘nolipsism’, the view that there are no selves. (Cf. Strawson’s ‘no-subject views’.)
They question post-Cartesian philosophy of mind that something substantial can
be inferred from self-consciousness, namely that human beings are something non-
physical from the description of ourselves. First, they draw upon the literature
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from Casteñada, Perry and onwards, and investigate the logical role of words that
point to ourselves such as ‘I’, ‘here’ and ‘now’ (reflexive designators) in practical
reasoning. They argue that reflexive designators are necessary to formulate ends,
reasons and means of action, and that therefore we describe ourselves in temporal,
spatial, and personal terms. Second, Ismael and Pollock entertain but do not
endorse the view associated with Wittgenstein and Anscombe that there are no
selves. For the logic of reflexive designators makes it impossible for us to say that
nolipsism is true. But reflexive designators could be built into a robot and function
in the requisite way without pointing to anything. This paper contains a very clear
argument, but the phrase ‘epistemic norms’ is used throughout without definition
and would seem to assume a deontological epistemology. Perhaps the authors use
it merely for the logic of reflexive designators (cf. ‘the logical structure of rational
cognition dictate the need for reflexive designators in sophisticated agents.’ (60)).
But since deontological epistemology is generally considered implausible, Ismael
and Pollock had done well in developing the meaning of ‘epistemic norms’ in this
otherwise fine piece.
In ‘Substance and Artifact in Aquinas’s Metaphysics’ Eleonore Stump exam-
ines Aquinas’s theory of material substances and its implications for his theory of
artifacts. She surveys Aquinas’s views on matter, form, substance, artefact, iden-
tity, composition and change. But there is, according to Stump, no non-circular
distinction between substance and artefact in Aquinas, so she suggests, first, a
distinction that would be consistent if Aquinas would grant that products of
contemporary technology (such as styrofoam) are substances and not artifacts.
Second, Stump argues that Aquinas holds that constitution is not identity, since
a whole is not identical to the parts that constitute it and the matter of a thing is
not a thing in itself when it is part of a constituent whole. Third, she argues that
the identity of a substance does not change with a change of components but the
identity of an artefact changes with a change of components, because substances
inform sheer materiality or potentiality and artifacts inform substances. The ma-
terial of this paper is found in a less truncated form in the first chapter of her book
Aquinas.
William Alston displays his meticulous analytical skills in ‘Epistemology
and Metaphysics’. He is concerned with ‘the reciprocal epistemic dependence of
epistemology and metaphysics’ (p. 103). By the term ‘metaphysics’ Alston means
the ‘factual knowledge’ (p. 82) or ‘factual assumptions’ (p. 89) of epistemology, and
so the issue is sadly framed by the empiricist prejudice that every consideration
which transcends the ‘empirical’ is ‘metaphysical’. Alston evaluates the objection
that the claim that epistemology is rightly based on factual knowledge is viciously
circular, namely that epistemological claims are warranted only if factual claims
are warranted, and that factual claims are warranted only if epistemological claims
are warranted. He attempts to solve this circularity problem in three stages. First,
in order to make the dependence of epistemology on factual knowledge clearer,
he distinguishes between epistemological theses regarding (1) general conditions
of warrant, (2) specific conditions of warrant and (3) the warrant of particular
judgements. The dependence of epistemology on factual knowledge is, of course,
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stronger for (2) and (3) than for (1). Second, in order to show that there need not be
a vicious circle, Alston differentiates between a weaker and a stronger dependency
claim. The weaker claim is conditional in meaning, namely epistemological claims
are warranted only if some factual claims are warranted. The stronger claim is
categorical in meaning, namely epistemological claims are warranted because some
factual claims are warranted. It is only the stronger claim and not the weaker one
that results in a vicious circle. For the categorical thesis makes a claim about
the warrant of factual claims, but the conditional thesis does not make any claims
about the warrant of factual claims. Third, Alston infers a level distinction between
being warranted and showing that one is warranted, namely the warrant of first
order claims and second order claims about the warrant of first order claims. As
long as we assume that the factual claims on which epistemological claims depend
for their warrant are themselves warranted, we can avoid any reciprocal epistemic
dependence of factual knowledge on epistemology. But as soon as we require that
the warrant of those factual claims has to be shown, we get into a mutual epistemic
dependence of epistemological claims and factual claims. According to Alston’s
rich paper, then, factual claims can be used to settle epistemological claims, and
epistemological claims, inter alia, to settle factual claims. For there is no practical
alternative to using whatever we take ourselves to have in settling whatever
intellectual questions concern us.’ (103)
In ‘Historicizing the Belief-Forming Self’ Nicholas Wolterstorff maintains
that Plantinga’s account of warrant is either mistaken or misleading. The ac-
count is mistaken if Plantinga denies that our powers to form judgements are
designed to be historically adapted, or it is misleading as he occasionally grants
that our power of judgement is designed to be historically adapted. In this paper
Wolterstorff aims to identify some of the main ways our powers of judgement
are designed to be historically acquired, modified and triggered. However, the
argument is not very clear. First, Wolterstorff argues that, contrary to appearance,
Gadamer presupposes that, but does not discuss how, the power of judgement
is historically determined, and that therefore he still maintains the a-historicism
of the Enlightenment. Second, he gleans from Hume and Reid that the power
of judging inductively is a product of one’s personal history. Third, we are told
that, according to Locke, the power of judgement may not be working properly
due to one’s personal history. Wolterstorff concludes then that ‘Plantinga’s ac-
count be amplified by adding the concept of doxastic programming’ (133) of one’s
personal history, although Wolterstorff ‘do[es] not for a moment believe that the
human mind is in fact a computer.’ (126) It seems that this paper could have been
formulated in a more simple, precise and concentrated way.
In the very clear and carefully argued paper ‘A Dilemma for Internalism’,
Michael Bergmann develops an objection to generic internalism in epistemology,
namely an argument against the view that the necessary condition which con-
tributes to justification is the awareness of a normal adult human. Such awareness
is either conceptual or not. However, to require awareness that the application
of a concept contributes to justification leads, according to Bergmann, either to
an infinite regress of awarenesses or a regress of increasingly complex aware-
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nesses. For such a concept of justification requires a higher level of awareness
for each lower level of awareness. The alternative is for the internalist to claim
that non-conceptual awareness confers justification, but one could, according to
Bergmann, be aware of an experience without conceiving of it as contributing to
justification and then internalism is subject to precisely the objection that it com-
monly uses against externalism. Bergmann further specifies his arguments with
how prominent internalists handle the regress problems in relation to examples
from perception and consciousness. In short, he argues that the excessive require-
ment and its sceptical implications makes internalism untenable. He also suggests
that internalism and externalism are not the only two positions in epistemology.
In ‘Epistemic Internalism, Philosophical Assurance and the Skeptical Predica-
ment’ Richard Fumerton revises his earlier argument against epistemological
externalism in Metaepistemology and Skepticism (1996). He argues that in ‘a philo-
sophically satisfying understanding of knowledge’ (181) lower-level justification
of memory and perception requires higher-level justification. This is not because
higher-level justification is a general requirement (and Fumerton devotes more
space opposing such a form of internalism than opposing generic externalism), but
because facts about what we are caused to believe by memory or perception are by
themselves, according to him, insufficient for an adequate theory of justification.
Facts about what we are acquainted with are, though, by themselves sufficient
for an adequate theory of justification and do not require higher-level justifica-
tion. We are ‘directly aware’, ‘conscious’ or ‘assured’ in the case of acquaintance,
but not so in cases of memory and perception. Since awareness, consciousness
or assurance are internal states, internalism provides, according to Fumerton, the
‘philosophically satisfying’ theory of justification. It is not clear how this is a re-
ductio against externalism (181). Nor why externalists should grant Fumerton’s
understanding of what is ‘philosophically satisfying’, especially when ‘skepticism
[. . . ] is difficult to avoid given [Fumerton’s] constraints’ (182) and scepticism can
be rebutted by other means.
In ‘Scientific Naturalism and the Value of Knowledge’ Jonathan Kvanvig ar-
gues that it is difficult to account for the value of knowledge ‘by employing only
those concepts that are already needed in a scientific description of the world.’
(195). He first contends that the requirement of natural science is too restrictive
to allow for pure naturalistic epistemologies. For such theories attempt to explain
knowledge in terms of factors that are outside consciousness, but ‘defeaters’ (or
grounds for doubt) can only be explained in terms of conscious factors and thus
not in terms of ‘scientifically respectable concepts’. Kvanvig continues to argue
that commitment to the methods of natural science pushes the philosopher either
towards virtue epistemology (where the analogy of internal causes of action and
judgement accounts for the value of knowledge) or epistemological expressivism
(where knowledge claims cannot have truth-value but only express attitudes).
Expressivism will be the alternative for scientism, since defeaters can then be ex-
plained as something that is sour to most people and knowledge as something that
is sweet to most people. But expressivism cannot, contends Kvanvig, be argued
for, since such an argument would presuppose the truth of epistemic norms and
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principles. In short, theories that explain knowledge only in terms of natural sci-
ence undercut the value of knowledge and any epistemology that undermines the
value of knowledge is inadequate. So this paper goes beyond much of the ordinary
discussion in contemporary epistemology. It is, though, surprising that Kvanvig
claims that the ‘the history of knowledge contains little discussion of the question
of the value of knowledge.’ (204) (This is of course true if one’s philosophical diet
contains a huge gap between Plato’s Meno and analytical epistemology.) For it
would seem that from Aristotle up until the philosophical tragedy of Descartes
that many philosophers argued for the value of knowledge in terms of its ut-
most actualisation of the power of cognition. But powers, abilities, dispositions or
propensities are of course things that are beyond the merely empirical, and would
require an argument that the methods of natural science are not identical with
those of philosophy. Such an argument had strengthened Kvanvig’s fine paper.
In the clear paper ‘Naturalism and Moral Realism’ Michael Rea contends
that only theists and not ‘naturalists’ can reasonable endorse moral realism. He
argues for this sharp conclusion in two steps. He argues, first, that any justification
from natural science will claim that the existence of objective moral facts is the
simplest explanation of empirical phenomena, and, second, that appeals to sim-
plicity can ground moral realism only if theism is true. (Is ‘a necessarily existing
rational community’ (237) more ‘close’ to theism than to polytheism?) However,
the suggestion that ‘someone or something in the universe is somehow benevo-
lently guaranteeing that’ simplicity will indicate truth (231), would just seem to
beg the question. Besides, this argument assumes, of course, that the only kind of
moral naturalism is an empirical or empiricist one, and then infers that God is the
only basis for moral realism, since empirical naturalism is problematic. There is,
of course, in addition teleological or dispositional moral naturalism (e.g. Aristotle,
Aquinas, Foot et alia), and there are the standard problems of essential goodness
and deontological arbitrariness for supernaturalism or theological voluntarism in
ethics.
Richard Otte (‘A Problem with Bayesian Conditionalization’) argues closely
against Bayesianism’s contention that conditionalization should be used to man-
age our beliefs or judgements. The Bayesian school of statistics claim that every
rational judgment is changed on condition of other judgements. Such conditional-
ization is, according to Bayesianism, a requirement of ideal rationality (whatever
that means). But Otte counters conditionalization by examples that we can be ratio-
nal in our mistaken judgements. We can be rational in spite of not conditionalizing
in situations where conditionalization is applicable, and thus the requirement of
conditionalization is not necessary for rationality. In addition Otte points out that
Bayesianism must admit that a judgement may be rationally changed either in
response to experience or in response to other judgements (and not merely in re-
sponse to other judgements). For unless judgements could be based and changed
on account of experience, there would be no judgment to apply the requirement
of conditionalization to. However, we can only use conditionalization to manage
our beliefs, if we know to which category our particular judgements belong. For
the requirement of conditionalization does not apply to judgements that are (at
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least partly) based on experience, but only to such as are based strictly on other
judgements. Commonly we cannot, though, know whether a judgment is based
on experience alone or on other judgements alone, and thus we cannot know if
the requirement of conditionalization applies to any our judgements. Hence con-
ditionalization cannot be used to manage our judgements. This problem arises,
Otte contends, because Bayesianism is a theory of rationality and rationality is
about conscious or internally accessible features of judgements. (Bayesians com-
monly require reflection and coherence for being rational.) But conditionalization
requires access to the basis of our judgements, and that is an external requirement.
Internalist reconstructions of the requirement of conditionalization are, moreover,
empty, have counterexamples or face regress problems.
In ‘Materialism and Post-Mortem Survival’ Keith Yandell laments that ‘a
number of Christian philosophers [. . . ] have embraced one or another variety
of materialism and [have] argued that their doing so is perfectly compatible
with their belief that they will survive bodily death.’ (258) But unfortunately the
philosophical issue gets lost in the innumerable formalizations of the simple into
the complex (e.g. the ‘definition of the possibility of fission’, 265), and the reduction
of necessity to logical necessity. And are we seriously to take C. S. Lewis Mere
Christianity (cf. 258) and Cartesian dualism for measures of Christian orthodoxy?
In ‘Split Brains and the Godhead’, Trenton Merricks aims to defend the
Christian doctrine of the Trinity from the charge of contradiction. He examines
and rejects defences in terms of relative identity and in terms of social relations.
According to the defence in terms of relative identity, the Father’s being the same
God as the Son and the Spirit does not entail that the Father is identical with
the Son or the Spirit. However, alleged relative identity relations are, according to
Merricks, unintelligible and there is arguably absolute identity. But a more modest
or attenuated version of relative identity may claim that identity is relative only
with respect to the Trinity. Yet, this makes the unintelligibility charge even more
compelling and the most natural understanding of the doctrine of the Trinity is that
it claims absolute identity. Merricks turns to defences of the doctrine of the Trinity
in terms of social relations. Although a claim that social relations exhaust the unity
of the three divine person renders the doctrine of the Trinity non-contradictory, it
is tritheistic since the relata are separate. Merricks argues instead by analogy of
distinct spheres of consciousness that there can be three persons in God. But this
Cartesian argument ends up (contra Merricks) in the Sabellian heresy that there
are ‘three distinct centres of consciousness.’ (318)
So this Festschrift covers a lot of ground and contains several very inter-
esting papers. But it is very hard to find one theme to discuss in these thirteen
papers—not even the reception of evaluation of Plantinga. For, oddly, interaction
with the one that is honoured by this volume is very rare. On the few occasions
that Plantinga’s views are discussed, it is by philosophers of his own generation;
his former students seem just to go along with his ideas. Another thing that is
striking with these papers is that the problems and the frame of reference inher-
ited from Descartes and Locke, or even Carnap and Quine, are simply taken for
granted. (There is of course an exception that confirms the rule.) This is surpris-
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ing, since Plantinga is often perceived as questioning the assumptions of modern
philosophy. Like most analytical philosophers the contributors use ‘traditional’
and ‘traditionally’ for how philosophy has been practiced in the English language
during the twentieth century or perhaps since Descartes and Locke. Most of the
papers in this book exemplify the rigour and thoroughness that analytical philos-
ophy is rightly known for and to which Plantinga has contributed, but I (for one)
thought we had left the modern paradigm of philosophy.
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